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e problem of pricing the cloud has aracted much recent aention due to the widespread use of cloud
computing and cloud services. From a theoretical perspective, several mechanisms that provide strong
eciency or fairness guarantees and desirable incentive properties have been designed. However, these
mechanisms oen rely on a rigid model, with several parameters needing to be precisely known in order for
the guarantees to hold. In this paper, we consider a stochastic model and show that it is possible to obtain
good welfare and revenue guarantees with simple mechanisms that do not make use of the information on
some of these parameters. In particular, we prove that a mechanism that sets the same price per time step
for jobs of any length achieves at least 50% of the welfare and revenue obtained by a mechanism that can set
dierent prices for jobs of dierent lengths, and the ratio can be improved if we have more specic knowledge
of some parameters. Similarly, a mechanism that sets the same price for all servers even though the servers
may receive dierent kinds of jobs can provide a reasonable welfare and revenue approximation compared to
a mechanism that is allowed to set dierent prices for dierent servers.
1 INTRODUCTION
With cloud computing generating billions of dollars per year and forming a signicant portion
of the revenue of large soware companies [Columbus, 2016], the problem of how to price cloud
resources and services is of great importance. On the one hand, for a pricing scheme to be used, it
is necessary that the scheme provide strong welfare and revenue guarantees. On the other hand, it
is also oen desirable that the scheme be simple. We combine the two objectives in this paper and
show that simple pricing schemes perform almost as well as more complex ones with respect to
welfare and revenue guarantees. In particular, consider the pricing scheme for virtual machines on
Microso Azure shown in Figure 1. Once the user chooses the basic parameters such as region, type,
and instance size, the price is calculated by simply multiplying an hourly base price by the number
of virtual machines and number of hours desired. e question that we study can be phrased in this
seing as follows: How much more welfare or revenue could be created if instead of this simple
multiplication formula, a complex table specifying the price for each number of hours were to be
used? Our main result is that the former oers at worst a two approximation to the laer, both
in terms of welfare and revenue. Similarly, we demonstrate that seing a single price for a group
of servers, even though the servers may receive dierent kinds of jobs, can provide a reasonable
welfare and revenue approximation compared to seing dierent prices for dierent servers.
In much of the prior work in this space, which focuses more explicitly on scheduling, prices
depend in a complex way on a number of parameters (typically including job length, arrival time,
deadline, and value) as well as the current state of the system [Azar et al., 2015, Dehghani et al.,
2016, Jain et al., 2011, 2012, Lucier et al., 2013]. A weakness of such schemes is that they require
these parameters to be known up front in order for the desirable properties of the mechanisms,
such as their approximation ratios, to hold. e availability of such information is not always
realistic in practice. Even when it is in principle possible to provide this information, there is a cost
to participants in both time and resources to gure it out. In this work, we show that good results
are possible with no up front information.
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Fig. 1. Pricing scheme for virtual machines on Microso Azure [Azure, 2016].
For our initial results we assume that there is a single server, which receives jobs of various
lengths whose value per time step is drawn from the same probability distribution regardless of
length. We compare the welfare and revenue that can be obtained by seing a price per time
step that is independent of the job length against the corresponding objective obtained by seing
an individual price for each job length. When we are allowed the freedom of seing dierent
prices for dierent job lengths, intuitively we want to set a higher price per time step for longer
jobs as a premium for reserving the server for a longer period of time.1 However, as we show,
we do not lose more than 50% of the welfare or revenue if we are only allowed to set one price.
We would like to emphasize that this is a worst-case bound over a wide range of parameters,
including the number of job lengths, the distribution over job lengths, and the distribution over
job values. Indeed, as we show, we can obtain improved bounds if we know the value of some of
these parameters. e price that we use in the single-price seing can be chosen from one of the
prices used in the multi-price seing, meaning that we do not have to calculate a price from scratch.
Moreover, all of our approximation guarantees hold generally for arbitrary prices, meaning that
for any prices that we may set in a multi-price seing (i.e., not necessarily optimal ones), we can
obtain an approximation of the welfare or revenue by seing one of those prices alone. Finally, we
emphasize that these results put no restrictions on the form of the distribution; it can be discrete,
continuous, or mixed. e only substantive constraint is that jobs of all lengths share the same
distribution of value per time step. However, in an extension we show that a version of our results
continues to hold even if this constraint is relaxed.
1Amazon recently started oering a product called “dened duration spot instances” where users can specify a duration in
hourly increments up to six hours. Indeed, the price per hour of this product increases as the number of hours increases.
(See Figure 2.)
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Fig. 2. Pricing scheme for defined duration spot instances on Amazon [Amazon, 2017].
We then generalize our results to a seing where there are multiple servers, each of which
receives jobs of various lengths. e distribution over job lengths can be dierent for dierent
servers. is is conceivable, for instance, if the servers are in various geographic locations or are
utilized by various groups of users. We compare the welfare and revenue obtained by a simple
pricing scheme that sets the same price for all servers against the corresponding objective achieved
by a scheme that can set a dierent (single) price for each server. Roughly speaking, we show that as
long as the parameters are not too extreme, e.g., the number of servers or the job lengths are not too
large, then we do not lose too much of the welfare or revenue by seing a single price. Combining
this with our initial results, we obtain an approximation of a very restricted pricing scheme where
we must set the same price for all servers and all job lengths against one where we can set an
individual price for each job length of each server. ese results require an assumption that all
servers have the same probability of not receiving a job at a time step. Using similar techniques,
we also obtain approximation bounds when this assumption does not hold but there is only one
job length across all servers.
1.1 Related work
Much recent work has focused on designing online scheduling mechanisms with good welfare
guarantees and incentive properties. Jain et al. [2011] exhibited a truthful mechanism for batch jobs
on cloud systems where jobs are allocated non-preemptively, and the same group of authors came
up with mechanisms for deadline-sensitive jobs in large computing clusters [Jain et al., 2012]. Lucier
et al. [2013] also considered the problem of scheduling deadline-sensitive jobs; they circumvented
known lower bounds by assuming that jobs could be delayed and still nish by their deadline.
Zhang et al. [2013] developed a framework for truthful online cloud auctions where users with
heterogeneous demands can come and leave on the y. More recently, Azar et al. [2015] constructed
a truthful mechanism that achieves a constant competitive ratio given that slackness is allowed,
while Dehghani et al. [2016] assumed a stochastic model and developed a truthful mechanism that
approximates the expected maximum welfare up to a constant factor. Wang et al. [2015] designed
mechanisms for selling reserved instances where users are allowed to reserve resources of any
length and from any time point in the future. eir mechanisms determine the acceptance and
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payment immediately when the job arrives, and achieve a competitive ratio that is optimal to
within a constant factor with regard to welfare.
Other work in this space has dealt with comparing pricing mechanisms such as the on-demand
market and the spot market [Abhishek et al., 2012, Dierks and Seuken, 2016, Hoy et al., 2016],
achieving fairness in job allocation [Friedman et al., 2014], and studying models of real-time pricing
with budget constraints [Friedman et al., 2015]. Kash and Key [2016] gave a survey of the current
state of research in economics and computer science with respect to cloud pricing.
From a technical perspective, our work bears a resemblance to the work of Du¨ing et al. [2016]
on discriminatory and anonymous posted pricing and of Disser et al. [2016] on hiring secretaries.
In particular, Du¨ing et al. considered the problem of selling a single item to buyers who arrive
sequentially with values drawn independently from identical distributions. ey showed that
by posting discriminatory prices, one can obtain at most 2 − 1/n times as much revenue as that
obtained by posting the same anonymous price, where n is the number of buyers. As is also the
case in our work, their anonymous price can always be chosen from one of the discriminatory
prices, but their bound is obtained via a relaxation of the discriminatory pricing problem, a dierent
technique than what we use. Disser et al. provided a competitive online algorithm for a variant of
the stochastic secretary problem, where applicants need to be hired over time. Upon the arrival
of each applicant, the cost per time step of the applicant is revealed, and we have to decide on
the duration of the employment, starting immediately. Once an applicant is accepted, we cannot
terminate the contract until the duration of the job is over.
Our work falls into the broader area of the design and analysis of simple mechanisms, particularly
posted price mechanisms. One of the motivations for studying simple mechanisms is that in practice,
designers are oen willing to partially give up optimality in return for simplicity. Mechanisms that
simply post prices on goods have received signicant aention since they reect perhaps the most
common way of selling goods in the real world, and moreover they leave no room for strategizing,
making them easy for agents to participate in. A long line of work has investigated how well such
mechanisms can approximate optimal mechanisms with respect to various objectives including
welfare [Cohen-Addad et al., 2016, Ezra et al., 2017, Feldman et al., 2015], revenue [Babaio et al.,
2011, Blumrosen and Holenstein, 2008, Chawla et al., 2010], and social costs [Cohen et al., 2015].
In Section 3.4 we show that techniques from this literature can recover some of our results under
relaxed assumptions.
2 PRELIMINARIES
We consider a system with a number of servers and discrete time steps. Each job takes an integer
number of time steps to complete and yields a value upon completion. e value per time step
of a job is drawn from a distribution which is independent of the length of the job. Let F be the
cumulative distribution function of this distribution and f the probability density function with
respect to a base measure µ, and dene `(x) = x f (x).2 We do not make any assumption on our
distribution; in particular, it need not be continuous or discrete, which is why we allow exibility
in terms of the base measure.
When a job request is made for a job to be served by a server, there is a price p per time step
which may depend on the job length and/or the server. If the value per time step of the job is at
least p, the server accepts and executes the job to completion. Otherwise, the server rejects the job.
e objectives in our model are the steady-state welfare and revenue for each pricing scheme. In
2For technical reasons, we will deviate slightly from the usual notion of cumulative distribution function. In particular, if
y is a random variable drawn from a distribution, then we dene its cumulative distribution function F (x ) as Pr[y < x ]
instead of the usual Pr[y ≤ x ]. is will only be important when we deal with discrete distributions.
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particular, we will be interested in the expected welfare and revenue per time step, given that the
job values are drawn from a probability distribution. is can also be thought of as the average
welfare and revenue per time step that result from a pricing scheme over a long period of time.
In Section 3, we assume that there is a single server. Each time step, either zero or one job
appears. A job with length ai appears with probability 0 < ri ≤ 1, where ∑ni=1 ri ≤ 1 and n denotes
the number of job lengths. We are allowed to set a price pi for jobs of length ai . If a server accepts
a job of length ai , it is busy and cannot accept other jobs for ai time steps, including the current
one. We compare the seing where we are forced to set the same price p for all job lengths against
the seing where we can set a dierent price pi for each job length ai . Note that if we could set
dierent prices for dierent job lengths, then to optimize welfare or revenue, intuitively we would
set a higher price per time step for longer jobs as a premium for reserving the server for a longer
period. Put dierently, once we accept a longer job, we are stuck with it for a longer period, during
which we miss the opportunity to accept other jobs. Consequently, we should set a higher standard
for accepting longer jobs. (See also Footnote 1.)
In Section 4, we assume that there are multiple servers. Each time step, either zero or one job
appears for each server 1 ≤ j ≤ n. For server j, a job with length aji appears with probability
0 < r ji ≤ 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ nj , where nj denotes the number of job lengths for server j. We do not
assume that the set of job lengths or the number of job lengths is identical across servers. On the
other hand, we assume that the probability of no job appearing at a time step is the same for all
servers, i.e.,
∑nj
i=1 r ji is constant for any j. In Subsection 4.1, we assume that we can set one price
per server, and we compare the seing where we are forced to set the same price p for all servers
against that where we can set a dierent price pj for each server j. In Subsection 4.2, we assume
that we can set a dierent price pji for each server j and each of its job lengths aji , and we compare
that seing against the one where we are forced to set the same price p for all servers and all job
lengths.
3 ONE SERVER
In this section, we assume that there is a single server, which receives jobs of various lengths. Aer
presenting an introductory example in Subsection 3.1, we consider the general seing with an
arbitrary number of job lengths in Subsection 3.2. In this seing, we show a 50% approximation for
both welfare and revenue of seing one price for all job lengths compared to seing an individual
price for each job length, for any realization of the parameters. Moreover, we show in Subsection
3.3 that our techniques provide a template for deriving tighter bounds if we have more specic
information on the parameters. In particular, when there are two job lengths, we show for each
seing of the parameters a tight approximation bound for welfare and revenue. Our approximation
results hold for arbitrary (i.e., not necessarily optimal) pricing schemes, and the price we use in
the single-price seing can be drawn from one of the prices in the multi-price seing. Finally,
in Subsection 3.4 we consider an extension that does not assume independence between the job
length and the value per time step.
3.1 Warm-Up: Uniform Distribution
As a warm-up example, assume that at any time step a job with length 1 or 2 appears with probability
50% each. e value per time step of a job is drawn from the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. Suppose
that we set a price per time step p1 for jobs of length 1 and p2 for jobs of length 2.
Consider an arbitrary time step when the server is free. If the job drawn at that time step has
length 1, then with probability p1 it has value below p1 and is rejected. In this case, the server
passes one time step without a job. Otherwise, the job has value at least p1 and is accepted. In
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this case, the expected welfare from executing the job is 1+p12 . Similarly, if the job has length 2,
then with probability p2 it is rejected, and with probability 1 − p2 it is accepted and yields expected
welfare 2 · 1+p22 = 1 + p2 over two time steps. Leing cw denote the expected welfare per time step
assuming that the server is free at the current time step, we have
0 = 12
(
−p1cw + (1 − p1)
(
1 + p1
2 − cw
))
+
1
2 (−p2cw + (1 − p2) (1 + p2 − 2cw )) .
e two terms on the right hand side correspond to jobs of length 1 and 2, which are drawn with
probability 1/2 each. In the case that a job of length 2 is drawn, with probability p2 it is rejected
and the server is idle for one time step, during which it would otherwise have produced expected
welfare cw . With the remaining probability 1 − p2 the job is accepted, yielding expected welfare
1 + p2 over two time steps, during which the server would otherwise have produced expected
welfare 2cw . e derivation for the term corresponding to jobs of length 1 is similar. By equating
the expected welfare with the variable denoting this quantity, we arrive at the equation above.
Solving for cw , we get
cw (p1,p2) =
(1−p1)(1+p1)
2 + (1 − p2)(1 + p2)
3 − p2 .
To maximize cw (p1,p2) over all values ofp1,p2, we should setp1 = 0. (Indeed, to maximize welfare
we should always accept jobs of length 1 since they do not interfere with future jobs.) en the
value of p2 that maximizes cw (p1,p2) is p2 = 3−
√
15
2 ≈ 0.261, yielding cw (p1,p2) = 6−
√
30 ≈ 0.522.
On the other hand, if we set the same price p = p1 = p2 for jobs with dierent lengths, our
welfare per time step becomes
cw (p) =
(1−p)(1+p)
2 + (1 − p)(1 + p)
3 − p =
3(1 − p)(1 + p)
2(3 − p) .
is is maximized at p = 3 − 2√2 ≈ 0.172, yielding cw (p) = 9 − 6
√
2 ≈ 0.515. Moreover, if we use
either of the prices in the optimal price combination for the two-price seing as the single price,
we get cw (0) = 0.5 and cw
(
3 −
√
15
2
)
≈ 0.510.
Next, we repeat the same exercise for revenue. We can derive the equations in the same way,
with the only dierence being that the revenue from accepting a job at price p is simply p. Leing
cr denote the revenue per time step, we have
0 = 12 (−p1cr + (1 − p1) (p1 − cr )) +
1
2 (−p2cr + (1 − p2) (2p2 − 2cr )) .
Solving for cr , we get
cr (p1,p2) = (1 − p1)p1 + 2(1 − p2)p23 − p2 .
To maximize cr over all values of p1,p2, we should set p1 = 0.5. (Indeed, to maximize revenue
we should always set the monopoly price for jobs of length 1 since they do not interfere with
future jobs.) en the value of p2 that maximizes cr (p1,p2) is p2 = 3 −
√
47
8 ≈ 0.576, yielding
cr (p1,p2) = 10 −
√
94 ≈ 0.304.
On the other hand, if we set the same price p = p1 = p2 for jobs with dierent lengths, our
revenue per time step becomes
cr (p) = (1 − p)p + 2(1 − p)p3 − p =
3(1 − p)p
3 − p .
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is is maximized at p = 3 − √6 ≈ 0.551, yielding cr (p) = 15 − 6
√
6 ≈ 0.303. Moreover, if we use
either of the prices in the optimal price combination for the two-price seing as the single price,
we get cr (0.5) = 0.3 and cr
(
3 −
√
47
8
)
≈ 0.302.
Observe that for both welfare and revenue, the maximum in the one-price seing is not far from
that in the two-price seing. In addition, in both cases at least one of the two prices in the optimal
price combination for the two-price seing, when used alone as a single price, performs almost
as well as the maximum in the two-price seing. In the remainder of this section, we will show
that this is not a coincidence, but rather a phenomenon that occurs for any set of job lengths, any
probability distribution over job lengths, and any probability distribution over job values.
3.2 General 50% Approximation
In this subsection, we consider a general seing with an arbitrary number of job lengths. We show
that even at this level of generality, it is always possible to obtain 50% of the welfare and revenue
of seing an individual price for each job length by seing just one price. Although the optimal
price in the one-price seing might be dierent from any of the prices in the multi-price seing,
we show that at least one of the prices in the laer seing can be used alone to achieve the 50%
guarantee.
Assume that there are jobs of lengths a1 ≤ a2 ≤ · · · ≤ an which appear at each time step
with probability r1, r2, . . . , rn , respectively. Suppose that we set a price per time step pi for jobs of
length ai . Recall that the value per time step of a job is drawn from a distribution with cumulative
distribution function F and probability density function f .
e following lemma gives the formulas for the expected welfare and revenue per time step. e
derivation is straightforward and can be found in the Appendix A.
Lemma 3.1. Let S = a1r1 + · · · + anrn and R = r1 + · · · + rn , and let cw and cr denote the expected
welfare and revenue per time step, respectively. We have
cw (p1,p2, . . . ,pn) =
a1r1
∫
x ≥p1 `dµ + · · · + anrn
∫
x ≥pn `dµ
S − ((a1 − 1)r1F (p1) + · · · + (an − 1)rnF (pn)) + (1 − R) (1)
and
cr (p1,p2 . . . ,pn) = a1r1(1 − F (p1))p1 + · · · + anrn(1 − F (pn))pn
S − ((a1 − 1)r1F (p1) + · · · + (an − 1)rnF (pn)) + (1 − R) . (2)
In particular, if p1 = · · · = pn = p, then
cw (p) =
S
∫
x ≥p `dµ
S − (S − R)F (p) + (1 − R)
and
cr (p) = S(1 − F (p))p
S − (S − R)F (p) + (1 − R) .
With the formulas for welfare and revenue in hand, we are ready to show the main result of this
section, which exhibits that the worst-case approximation ratio for welfare or revenue between the
single-price seing and the multi-price seing is at least 50%. As we will see later in Subsection 3.3,
this bound is in fact tight, and it remains tight even when there are only two job lengths. Note
that the bound holds for any number of job lengths, any distribution over job lengths, and any
distribution over job values.
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Theorem 3.2. For any prices p1,p2, . . . ,pn that we set in the multi-price seing, we can achieve a
welfare (resp. revenue, or any convex combination of welfare and revenue) approximation of at least
50% in the one-price seing by using one of the prices pi as the single price.
To prove eorem 3.2, we work with the ratio
max(cw (p1), . . . , cw (pn))
cw (p1, . . . ,pn)
and show that it is at least 1/2 for any p1, . . . ,pn (and similarly for revenue or any convex combi-
nation of welfare and revenue). Using the formula (1) for cw given in Lemma 3.1, we can write the
ratio in terms of the variables Ai =
∫
x≥pi `dµ∫
x≥p1 `dµ
and Bi = F (pi ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For any xed values of
Bi , we then deduce the values of Ai that minimize the ratio of interest. Finally, we show that the
remaining expression is always at least 1/2 no maer the values of Bi . e full proof can be found
in Appendix B.
3.3 Tighter bounds for specific parameters
Assume in this subsection that there are jobs of two lengths a < b which appear at each time step
with probability r1 and r2, respectively, where r1 + r2 ≤ 1. Suppose that we set a price per time
step p1 for jobs of length a and p2 for jobs of length b. Recall that the value per time step of a job is
drawn from a distribution with cumulative distribution function F and probability density function
f .
Our next result exhibits a tight approximation bound for any xed seing of the job lengths and
their distribution.
Theorem 3.3. For any prices p1 and p2 that we set in the two-price seing, we can achieve a welfare
(resp. revenue, or any convex combination of welfare and revenue) approximation of at least
ρ(a,b, r1, r2) := (ar1 + br2)(ar1 + 1 − r1)
a(a − 1)r 21 + a(b − 1)r1r2 + ar1 + br2
in the one-price seing by seing either p1 or p2 alone. Moreover, this bound is the best possible even if
we are allowed to set a price dierent from p1 or p2 in the one-price seing.
To prove this theorem, we work with the expression in terms of Bi = F (pi ) that we have from
the proof of eorem 3.2. We then show that the expression is minimized when we take B1 = 0 and
B2 = 1, meaning that the distribution on job values is bimodal. e proof method readily yields an
example showing that our bound is tight, where the bimodal distribution on job values puts a large
probability on a low value and a small probability on a high value. e full proof can be found in
Appendix C.
eorem 3.3 allows us to obtain the worst-case approximation ratio in arbitrary seings of the
parameters. Some examples follow.
• Suppose that r1 + r2 = 1, i.e., a job appears at every time step. is assumption can in
fact be made without loss of generality, because we can convert jobs not arriving to jobs
arriving with a value of 0 as long as all prices are nonzero. is only changes F and so is
irrelevant for the calculation of ρ. In this case, the approximation ratio is
ρ(a,b, r , 1 − r ) = (ar + b − br )(ar + 1 − r )
a(a − b)r 2 + b(a − 1)r + b .
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• Next, we look at how the bound behaves when the job lengths are close together or far
apart. Suppose for convenience that r1 = r2 = 1/2, i.e., a job appears at every time step and
is of length a or b with equal probability. en the approximation ratio is
ρ
(
a,b,
1
2 ,
1
2
)
=
(a + b)(a + 1)
a2 + ab + 2b .
In particular, the approximation ratio is
– 67 if a = 1 and b = 2;
– 45 if a = 1 and b = 3;
– 1516 if a = 2 and b = 3;
– a+1a+2 if b →∞.
Note that if b → ∞, then the ratio approaches 1 as a grows. is makes sense because
when the two job lengths are large and close to each other, there is lile dierence between
accepting one or the other. Also, if we take b = a + 1, then the ratio becomes
ρ
(
a,a + 1, 12 ,
1
2
)
=
2a2 + 3a + 1
2a2 + 3a + 2 .
is also converges to 1 as a →∞.
• We now consider the behavior of the bound when the shorter job length is xed. Suppose
for convenience that a = 1, i.e., the shorter job length is 1. en the approximation ratio is
ρ(1,b, r1, r2) = r1 + br2(b − 1)r1r2 + r1 + br2 .
As the longer job length grows, this ratio decreases and approaches 11+r1 . is is consistent
with the intuition that the approximation gets worse as the job lengths are farther apart.
• We next look at the “opposite” of the previous case and assume that the longer job length
is extremely large. Suppose that b →∞. en the approximation ratio is
ρ(a,∞, r1, r2) = ar1 + 1 − r1
ar1 + 1
.
Note that this ratio does not depend on r2. e ratio increases as the shorter job length
grows. Again, this is consistent with the intuition that the approximation gets worse as the
job lengths are farther apart.
If we x the probabilities r1, r2, we can derive a tight worst-case bound over all possible job
lengths a,b.
Theorem 3.4. For xed r1, r2, we have
ρ(a,b, r1, r2) ≥ 11 + r1
for arbitrary a,b. Moreover, this bound is the best possible.
Proof. From eorem 3.3, we need to show the inequality
(ar1 + br2)(ar1 + 1 − r1)
a(a − 1)r 21 + a(b − 1)r1r2 + ar1 + br2
≥ 11 + r1 .
is simplies to
r1(a(a − 1)r 21 + (a − 1)br1r2 + ar1 + ar2) ≥ 0.
Since each term on the le-hand side is nonnegative, the inequality holds.
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For tightness of the bound, let a = 1 and b →∞. e approximation ratio is
ρ(1,∞, r1, r2) = r1 + br2
r1(1 − r2) + br2(1 + r1)
=
1
1 + r1
,
as desired. 
Note that the fact that the bound is tight at a = 1 and b →∞ is consistent with the intuition that
the further apart the job lengths are, the more welfare and revenue there is to be gained by seing
dierent prices for dierent job lengths, and consequently the worse the approximation ratio.
Finally, we show that we can obtain at least 50% of the welfare or revenue from seing two
prices by using one of those prices.
Theorem 3.5. For arbitrary a,b, r1, r2, we have
ρ(a,b, r1, r2) ≥ 12 .
Moreover, this bound is the best possible.
Proof. Using eorem 3.4, we nd that
ρ(a,b, r1, r2) ≥ 11 + r1 ≥
1
2
since r1 ≤ 1.
For tightness of the bound, let a = 1 and r2 = 1 − r1. e approximation ratio is
ρ(1,b, r , 1 − r ) = r + (1 − r )b
r 2 + (1 − r 2)b .
Taking b = 1(1−r )2 , the ratio becomes
r + 11−r
r 2 + 1+r1−r
=
r − r 2 + 1
r 2 − r 3 + 1 + r ,
which approaches 1/2 as r → 1−.3 
While we do not have a general formula for the worst-case approximation ratio for each choice
of the parameters a1, . . . ,an , r1, . . . , rn as we do for the case of two job lengths, the function h in
the proof of eorem 3.2 still allows us to derive a tighter bound for each specic case. Note that to
nd the minimum of h, it suces to check Bi = 0 or 1 (see Footnote 6), so we only have a nite
number of cases to check.
In fact, one can show that the minimum is always aained when B1 = 0 and Bn = 1. However,
as we show next, the remaining Bi ’s may be 0 or 1 at the minimum, depending on the job lengths
and the probability distribution over them. We take n = 3 and assume for convenience that
r1 = r2 = r3 = 1/3 and (a1,a2) = (2, 3). e following examples show that B2 can be 0 or 1 at the
minimum depending on how far the longest job length a3 is from a1 and a2.
3e approximation ratio does not necessarily converge to 1/2 for an arbitrary direction as b → ∞ and r → 1−. For
instance, if we take b = 11−r and r → 1−, then the ratio converges to 2/3.
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• Suppose that a3 = 6. en we have
h(B1,B2,B3) = 121 − 11B1 − 22B2 − 55B3121 − 16B1 − 24B2 − 48B3 .
is is minimized at (B1,B2,B3) = (0, 1, 1), where its value is 44/49.
• Suppose that a3 = 7. en we have
h(B1,B2,B3) = 48 − 4B1 − 8B2 − 24B348 − 6B1 − 9B2 − 21B3 .
is is minimized at (B1,B2,B3) = (0,B2, 1) for any 0 ≤ B2 ≤ 1, where its value is 8/9.
• Suppose that a3 = 8. en we have
h(B1,B2,B3) = 169 − 13B1 − 26B2 − 91B3169 − 20B1 − 30B2 − 80B3 .
is is minimized at (B1,B2,B3) = (0, 0, 1), where its value is 78/89.
e above examples show that the transition point where the optimal value of B2 goes from 0
to 1 for r1 = r2 = r3 = 1/3 and (a1,a2) = (2, 3) is at a3 = 7, where h(B1,B2,B3) takes on the same
value for any 0 ≤ B2 ≤ 1.
3.4 Extension
In this subsection, we show that by using a single price, we can obtain 50% of the welfare not only
compared to using multiple prices, but also compared to the oine optimal welfare.4 In fact, we
will also not need the assumption that the job length and the value per time step are independent.
However, the result only works for particular prices rather than arbitrary ones, and we cannot
obtain tighter results for specic parameters using this method.
Theorem 3.6. Assume that the job length and the value per time step are not necessarily independent.
ere exists a price p such that we can achieve a 50% approximation of the oine optimal welfare by
using p as the single price.
e proof of eorem 3.6 can be found in Appendix D.
4 MULTIPLE SERVERS
In this section, we assume that there are multiple servers, each of which receives jobs of various
lengths. Under the assumption that the servers have the same probability of receiving no job at a
time step, we show in Subsection 4.1 an approximation bound of the welfare and revenue of seing
one price for all servers compared to seing an individual price for each server. is yields a strong
bound when at least one of the dimensions of the parameters is not too extreme, e.g., the number
of servers or the job lengths are not too large. In Subsection 4.2, we combine the newly obtained
results with those from Section 3. Using a composition technique, we derive a general result that
compares the welfare and revenue obtained by a restricted mechanism that sets the same price
for all servers and all job lengths against those obtained by a mechanism that can set a dierent
price for each job length of each particular server. We show that even with the heavy restrictions,
the former mechanism still provides a reasonable approximation to the laer in a wide range of
situations. Using similar techniques, we also obtain approximation bounds when this assumption
does not hold but there is only one job length across all servers. e analysis of the laer seing is
deferred to Appendix E.
4For the oine optimal welfare, we compute the limit of the expected average oine optimal welfare per time step as the
time horizon grows.
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As in Section 3, our approximation results hold for arbitrary (i.e., not necessarily optimal) pricing
schemes, and the price we use in the single-price seing can be drawn from one of the prices in
the multi-price seing.
4.1 One price per server
Assume that at each time step, either zero or one job appears for each server 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Server
j receives jobs of length aj1 ≤ aj2 ≤ · · · ≤ ajnj with probability r j1, r j2, . . . , r jnj , respectively.
Suppose that we set a price per time step pj for all jobs on server j. Recall that the value per time
step of a job is drawn from a distribution with cumulative distribution function F and probability
density function f , and that we assume that
∑nj
i=1 r ji is constant. Let S j = aj1r j1 + · · · + ajnj r jnj and
R = r j1 + · · · + r jnj .
Using the formula (1) for cw given in Lemma 3.1, we nd that the welfare per time step is
dw (p1,p2, . . . ,pn) =
n∑
j=1
S j
∫
x ≥pj `dµ
S j − (S j − R)F (pj ) + (1 − R)
=
n∑
j=1
∫
x ≥pj `dµ
1 −
(
1 − RSj
)
F (pj ) + 1−RSj
.
If we set the same price p = p1 = · · · = pn for dierent servers, our welfare per time step becomes
dw (p) =
n∑
j=1
∫
x ≥p `dµ
1 −
(
1 − RSj
)
F (p) + 1−RSj
.
Similarly, we have the formulas for revenue per time step
dr (p1,p2, . . . ,pn) =
n∑
j=1
(1 − F (pj ))pj
1 −
(
1 − RSj
)
F (pj ) + 1−RSj
and
dr (p) =
n∑
j=1
(1 − F (p))p
1 −
(
1 − RSj
)
F (p) + 1−RSj
.
We show that if at least one dimension of the parameters is not too extreme, e.g., the number
of servers or the job lengths are bounded, then we can obtain a reasonable approximation of the
welfare and revenue in the multi-price seing by seing just one price.
Theorem 4.1. For any prices p1,p2, . . . ,pn that we set in the multi-price seing, we can achieve a
welfare (resp. revenue, or any convex combination of welfare and revenue) approximation of at least
max
(
1
Hn
,
M − 1
M lnM
)
in the one-price seing, where Hn = 1 + 12 + · · · + 1n ≈ lnn is the nth Harmonic number and
M = maxi, j SiSj .
In particular, if all job lengths are bounded above by c , then R ≤ S j ≤ cR for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and so
maxi, j SiSj ≤ c . e theorem then implies that the approximation ratio is at least c−1c ln c .
e proof follows a similar outline to that of eorem 3.2, but the details are more involved. It
can be found in Appendix F.
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4.2 Multiple prices per server
Assume as in Subsection 4.1 that at each time step, server j receives jobs of length aj1 ≤ aj2 ≤
· · · ≤ ajnj with probability r j1, r j2, . . . , r jnj , respectively. In this subsection, we consider seing an
individual price not only for each server but also for each job length of that server. In particular,
suppose that we set a price per time step pji for jobs of length aji on server j. Recall that the
value per time step of a job is drawn from a distribution with cumulative distribution function
F and probability density function f , and that we assume that
∑nj
i=1 r ji is constant. Let S j =
aj1r j1 + · · · + ajnj r jnj .
We will compare a seing where we have considerable freedom with our pricing scheme and
can set a dierent price pji for each job length aji on each server j with a seing where we have
limited freedom and must set the same price p for all job lengths and all servers. We show that by
“composing” our results on the two dimensions, we can obtain an approximation of the welfare and
revenue of seing dierent prices by seing a single price.
Theorem 4.2. For any prices pji , where 1 ≤ j ≤ n and 1 ≤ i ≤ nj for each j, that we set in the
multi-price seing, we can achieve a welfare (resp. revenue, or any convex combination of welfare and
revenue) approximation of at least
1
2 ·max
(
1
Hn
,
M − 1
M lnM
)
in the one-price seing, where Hn = 1 + 12 + · · · + 1n ≈ lnn is the nth Harmonic number and
M = maxi, j SiSj .
Proof. Consider welfare. By eorem 3.2, for each server j we can achieve an 12 -approximation of
the welfare in the multi-price seing by seing a single pricepj for all job lengths. On the other hand,
using eorem 4.1, we can approximate the laer welfare by a factor of max
(
1
Hn
, M−1M lnM
)
by seing
a single price p for all servers. erefore, seing a single price p also yields a 12 ·max
(
1
Hn
, M−1M lnM
)
-
approximation of the original welfare.
e same argument holds for revenue and for any convex combination of welfare and revenue. 
If we have tighter approximations for either the “dierent prices for dierent job lengths” or the
“dierent prices for dierent servers” dimension, for instance by knowing the values of some of the
parameters, then the same composition argument yields a correspondingly tighter bound.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study how well simple pricing schemes that are oblivious to certain parameters
can approximate optimal schemes with respect to welfare and revenue, and prove several results
when the simple schemes are restricted to seing the same price for all servers or all job lengths.
Our results provide an explanation of the ecacy of such schemes in practice, including the one
shown in Figure 1 for virtual machines on Microso Azure. Since simple schemes do not require
agents to spend time and resources to determine their specic parameter values, our results also
serve as an argument in favor of using these schemes in a range of applications. It is worth noting
that as all of our results are of worst case nature, we can expect the guarantees on welfare and
revenue to be signicantly beer than these pessimistic bounds in practical instances where the
parameters are not adversarially tailored.
We believe that there is still much interesting work to be done in the study of simple pricing
schemes for the cloud. We conclude our paper by listing some intriguing future directions.
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• In many scheduling applications, a job can be scheduled online to any server that is not
occupied at the time. Does a good welfare or revenue approximation hold in such a model?
• Can our results be extended to models with more uid job arrivals, for example one where
several jobs can arrive at each time step?
• Can we approximate welfare and revenue simultaneously? A trivial randomized approach
would be to choose with equal probability whether to approximate welfare or revenue.
According to eorem 3.2, this yields a 1/4-approximation for both expected welfare and
expected revenue of the single-price seing in comparison to the multi-price seing for
job lengths.
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A PROOF OF LEMMA 3.1
We represent the states of the server by a Markov chain. Initially, we have an idle state corresponding
to when the server is free. For each job length ai , we create ai − 1 states that the server goes
through when it accepts a job of length ai . e states represent the number of time steps remaining
to complete the service of the job before the server returns to the idle state. e rewards, which can
be either welfare or revenue, are collected at each transition. e structure of the Markov chain
makes solving for the stationary distribution straightforward. is distribution gives the average
proportion of time spent in each transition and the average welfare or revenue can be wrien in
terms of these proportions. If the threshold for accepting a job of a certain length is p, then the
revenue collected for each transition with that job length is always p, while the expected welfare
gained during the transition is given by
∫
x≥p `dµ
1−F (p) . is allows us to write down the formulas for cw
and cr .
Next, we present a simpler approach that is perhaps less formal. Consider an arbitrary time step
when the server is free. If the job drawn at that time step has length a1, then with probability F (p1)
it has value below p1 and is rejected, and with probability 1 − F (p1) it has value at least p1 and is
accepted. In the laer case, the job yields expected welfare
∫
x≥p1 `dµ
1−F (p1) per time step over a1 time
steps. Analogous statements hold if the job has length ai for 2 ≤ i ≤ n. It follows that
0 = r1
(
−F (p1)cw + (1 − F (p1))
(
a1 ·
∫
x ≥p1 `dµ
1 − F (p1) − a1cw
))
+ r2
(
−F (p2)cw + (1 − F (p2))
(
a2 ·
∫
x ≥p2 `dµ
1 − F (p2) − a2cw
))
+ . . .
+ rn
(
−F (pn)cw + (1 − F (pn))
(
an ·
∫
x ≥pn `dµ
1 − F (pn) − ancw
))
+ (1 − r1 − r2 − · · · − rn)(−cw ).
Solving for cw , we have
cw (p1,p2, . . . ,pn) =
a1r1
∫
x ≥p1 `dµ + · · · + anrn
∫
x ≥pn `dµ
S − ((a1 − 1)r1F (p1) + · · · + (an − 1)rnF (pn)) + (1 − R) .
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For revenue, we can derive the equations in the same way, with the exception that the revenue
from accepting a job at price p is simply p. We have
0 = r1 (−F (p1)cr + (1 − F (p1)) (a1p1 − a1cr ))
+ r2 (−F (p2)cr + (1 − F (p2)) (a2p2 − a2cr ))
+ . . .
+ rn (−F (pn)cr + (1 − F (pn)) (anpn − ancr ))
+ (1 − r1 − r2 − · · · − rn)(−cr ).
Solving for cr , we get
cr (p1,p2 . . . ,pn) = a1r1(1 − F (p1))p1 + · · · + anrn(1 − F (pn))pn
S − ((a1 − 1)r1F (p1) + · · · + (an − 1)rnF (pn)) + (1 − R) .
B PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2
We rst consider welfare. We wish to show that seing one of the prices pi alone achieves an
approximation of 1/2 of seing all n prices. at is,
max(cw (p1), . . . , cw (pn)) ≥ 12 · cw (p1, . . . ,pn).
To establish this inequality, we will work with the ratio
max(cw (p1), . . . , cw (pn))
cw (p1, . . . ,pn)
and show that its minimum is at least 1/2.
Writing Ai =
∫
x≥pi `dµ∫
x≥p1 `dµ
(in particular, A1 = 1) and Bi = F (pi ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the ratio to minimize
becomes
д(A1, . . . ,An ,B1, . . . ,Bn) := nmax
i=1
(
SAi
S − (S − R)Bi + (1 − R)
)
· S − ((a1 − 1)r1B1 + · · · + (an − 1)rnBn) + (1 − R)
a1r1A1 + · · · + anrnAn .
Case 1: e max function outputs the rst term, SA1S−(S−R)B1+(1−R) .
Taking into account that A1 = 1, we want to minimize the ratio
S
S − (S − R)B1 + (1 − R) ·
S − ((a1 − 1)r1B1 + · · · + (an − 1)rnBn) + (1 − R)
a1r1 + a2r2A2 + · · · + anrnAn ,
where Ai ≤ S−(S−R)Bi+(1−R)S−(S−R)B1+(1−R) for i ≥ 2.
For any Ai , if we x the remaining Aj and all Bj , this is a decreasing function in Ai . To minimize
it, we should set Ai = S−(S−R)Bi+(1−R)S−(S−R)B1+(1−R) for all i ≥ 2. e ratio becomes
S2 − ((a1 − 1)r1B1 + · · · + (an − 1)rnBn)S + S(1 − R)
S2 − (a1r1B1 + · · · + anrnBn)(S − R) + S(1 − R) .
Case 2: e max function outputs the ith term, SAiS−(S−R)Bi+(1−R) , for some i ≥ 2. is means that
Aj ≤ S−(S−R)Bj+(1−R)S−(S−R)Bi+(1−R) · Ai for all j ≥ 2 with j , i , and Ai ≥
S−(S−R)Bi+(1−R)
S−(S−R)B1+(1−R) . We want to minimize
the ratio
SAi
S − (S − R)Bi + (1 − R) ·
S − ((a1 − 1)r1B1 + · · · + (an − 1)rnBn) + (1 − R)
a1r1 + a2r2A2 + · · · + anrnAn ,
Ian A. Kash, Peter Key, and Warut Suksompong 17
or equivalently,
SAi
a1r1A1 + · · · + anrnAn ·
S − ((a1 − 1)r1B1 + · · · + (an − 1)rnBn) + (1 − R)
S − (S − R)Bi + (1 − R) .
For any j ≥ 2 with j , i , if we x all terms Ak except Aj and x all Bk , then this function is
decreasing in Aj . To minimize it, we should set Aj =
S−(S−R)Bj+(1−R)
S−(S−R)Bi+(1−R) · Ai . e resulting function is
increasing in Ai if we x all Bk , so we should set Ai = S−(S−R)Bi+(1−R)S−(S−R)B1+(1−R) . We obtain the same ratio as
in Case 1.
Hence in either case, we are le with minimizing the function
h(B1, . . . ,Bn) := S
2 − ((a1 − 1)r1B1 + · · · + (an − 1)rnBn)S + S(1 − R)
S2 − (a1r1B1 + · · · + anrnBn)(S − R) + S(1 − R) .
In particular, we want to show thath(B1, . . . ,Bn) ≥ 12 for any choice of B1, . . . ,Bn . is is equivalent
to
S2 + S(1 − R) ≥ (2S(a1 − 1) − a1(S − R))r1B1 + · · · + (2S(an − 1) − an(S − R))rnBn
or
S2 + S(1 − R) ≥ ((a1 − 2)S + a1R)r1B1 + · · · + ((an − 2)S + anR)rnBn .
We consider two cases.
(1) a1 ≥ 2 (and hence a2, . . . ,an ≥ 2). All coecients of riBi on the right-hand side are positive,
so we only need to verify the inequality for B1 = · · · = Bn = 1. We have
h(B1 = 1, . . . ,Bn = 1) = S
2 − ((a1 − 1)r1 + · · · + (an − 1)rn)S + S(1 − R)
S2 − (a1r1 + · · · + anrn)(S − R) + S(1 − R)
=
S2 − (S − R)S + S(1 − R)
S2 − S(S − R) + S(1 − R) = 1 >
1
2 .
(2) a1 = 1.5 All coecients of riBi on the right-hand side except the rst one are positive, so
we only need to verify the inequality for B1 = 0 and B2 = · · · = Bn = 1. We have
h(B1 = 0,B2 = 1, . . . ,Bn = 1) = S
S + r1(S − R) >
1
2 ,
where the last line follows from r1(S − R) < 1 · S = S .
So the inequality holds in both cases, and the approximation ratio is at least 12 , as claimed.
Finally, we can obtain analogous results for revenue by essentially repeating the same argument
but instead writing Ai = (1−F (pi ))pi(1−F (p1))p1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and for any convex combination of welfare and
revenue by writing Ai as the appropriate convex combination of the two corresponding terms.
C PROOF OF THEOREM 3.3
Using the proof of eorem 3.2, we are le with minimizing the function
h(B1,B2) := S
2 − ((a − 1)r1B1 + (b − 1)r2B2)S + S(1 − R)
S2 − ar1(S − R)B1 − br2(S − R)B2 + S(1 − R) .
Note that the numerator and the denominator are positive for all 0 ≤ B1,B2 ≤ 1. When
B1 = B2 = B, both terms are equal to
S2 − S(S − R)B + S(1 − R),
and so h(B1,B2) = 1. Moreover, using the assumption a < b, we nd that
5e proof proceeds similarly if there are other ai ’s equal to 1.
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• h(B1,B2) < 1 when B1 = 0 and B2 > 0, and
• h(B1,B2) > 1 when B1 > 0 and B2 = 0.
Hence the function h(B1,B2) is increasing in B1 for xed B2, and decreasing in B2 for xed B1.6
is implies that the function is minimized when B1 = 0 and B2 = 1, where its value is
h(B1 = 0,B2 = 1) = S
2 − (b − 1)r2S + S(1 − R)
S2 − br2(S − R) + S(1 − R)
=
(ar1 + br2)(ar1 + 1 − r1)
a(a − 1)r 21 + a(b − 1)r1r2 + ar1 + br2
= ρ(a,b, r1, r2),
as claimed.
Next, we show that the approximation ratio is tight even if we are allowed to set an arbitrary
price (i.e., not necessarily p1 or p2) in the one-price seing. To this end, consider a discrete bimodal
distribution where a high probability q1 ≈ 1 is put on a value v1 ≈ 0 and a small probability q2 ≈ 0
is put on a value v2 ≈ 1.7 e values v1,v2 and the probabilities are chosen arbitrarily close to 0
and 1 and so that the relation
q2v2
q1v1
=
1
S − R
is satised.
In the two-price seing, we can set prices p1 = v1 and p2 = v2 and obtain welfare
cw (p1 = v1,p2 = v2) = ar1(q1v1 + q2v2) + br2(q2v2)
S − ((a − 1)r1F (v1) + (b − 1)r2F (v2)) + (1 − R)
≈ ar1(q1v1 + q2v2) + br2(q2v2)
S − (b − 1)r2 + (1 − R)
=
q2v2(ar1(S + 1 − R) + br2)
S − (b − 1)r2 + (1 − R) .
On the other hand, in the one-price seing there are three price ranges that we can pick: [0,v1],
(v1,v2], and (v2,∞). If we set a price in the range (v2,∞), no job is accepted and the welfare is zero.
For each of the other two ranges, seing any price in the range yields the same set of accepted jobs
and thus the same welfare. Hence it suces to consider seing prices v1 and v2. We have
cw (p = v1) = S(q1v1 + q2v2)
S + 1 − R = Sq2v2
and
cw (p = v2) ≈ Sq2v2
S − (S − R) + (1 − R) = Sq2v2.
6To see this, observe that an arbitrary function of the form f (x ) = p+qxr+sx for real constants p, q, r, s is either increasing,
decreasing, or constant in any interval where the denominator is nonzero, depending on whether qr − ps is positive,
negative, or zero, respectively.
7Intuitively, we want to accept all short jobs but only high-valued long jobs. We can do this in the two-price seing, while
in the one-price seing we are forced to either accept low-valued long jobs or reject low-valued short jobs.
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We obtain the same welfare per time step in either case. It follows that the approximation ratio
is at most
cw (p = v1)
cw (p1 = v1,p2 = v2) =
Sq2v2(S − (b − 1)r2 + (1 − R))
q2v2(ar1(S + 1 − R) + br2)
=
S(ar1 + 1 − r1)
a(a − 1)r 21 + a(b − 1)r1r2 + ar1 + br2
= ρ(a,b, r1, r2).
Finally, we can obtain analogous results for revenue by essentially repeating the same argument
but instead writing A2 = (1−F (p2))p2(1−F (p1))p1 in the proof of eorem 3.2, and for any convex combination of
welfare and revenue by writingA2 as the appropriate convex combination of the two corresponding
terms.
D PROOF OF THEOREM 3.6
We prove the result for a distribution with discrete support and extend it to continuous and mixed
support later. Our approach follows that of Feldman et al. [2015]. As job length and value are not
independent, assume that there are jobs of classes 1, 2, . . . ,n and that a job of class j arrives with
probability r j , has length aj and value per timestep vj . Note that aj and vj need not be dierent for
dierent classes of jobs.
We can write an “expected LP” to upper bound the maximum welfare per timestep as follows:
Opt = max
∑
j
x jvjaj s.t.
x j ≤ r j∑
j
x jaj ≤ 1
Here, Opt is the optimal long-run average welfare per time step, and the ratio x j/r j can be
thought of as the probability that an arriving job of class j is accepted. e constraints then say
that this probability is at most 1 and that we cannot accept more jobs in expectation than, if they
arrived perfectly, would saturate the machine.
Take p = Opt/2,and consider some time t . Let yt be the probability that the server is occupied at
time t (possibly by the job arriving at time t ). en the expected revenue at time t ispyt = (Opt/2)·yt .
e expected consumer surplus of the job arriving at time t is at least
∑
j r j (vj −p)aj (1−yt ), because
the probability that the server is unoccupied at time t (either by the job arriving at time t or by
an earlier job) is a lower bound on the probability that the server was not occupied when the job
at time t arrived. By the constraints of the LP, the consumer surplus is at least (Opt/2) · (1 − yt ).
Welfare is the sum of revenue and consumer surplus, so summing over all t shows that the welfare
per time step is at least Opt/2.
If the support of the distribution is not discrete, a similar argument still works. To determine
Opt , we order the jobs in decreasing order of value per timestep and take the jobs until the machine
is saturated. e rest of the proof then follows in the same way as before, with sums replaced by
integrals.
As a further extension, this argument can also be adapted to the multiple server case. We can
solve the expected LP for each server individually and compute a price pi = Opti/2. We can then
select whichever of these prices maximizes welfare to recover the 1/Hn bound from eorem 4.2.
(For some i , the welfare from the i servers with the largest values of Opti at price pi , which we can
lower bound as iOpti/2, must be at least 12Hn
∑
i Opti .)
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E MULTIPLE SERVERS, ONE JOB LENGTH
Assume that at each time step, either zero or one job appears for each server. Server j receives a
job of length a with probability r j . Suppose that we set a price per time step pj for jobs on server j.
Recall that the value per time step of a job is drawn from a distribution with cumulative distribution
function F and probability density function f .
Using the formula (1) for cw given in Lemma 3.1, we nd that the welfare per time step is
ew (p1,p2, . . . ,pn) =
n∑
j=1
ar j
∫
x ≥pj `dµ
ar j − (a − 1)r jF (pj ) + (1 − r j )
=
n∑
j=1
a
∫
x ≥pj `dµ
(a − 1)(1 − F (pj )) + 1r j
.
If we set the same price p = p1 = · · · = pn for dierent servers, our welfare per time step becomes
ew (p) =
n∑
j=1
a
∫
x ≥p `dµ
1
r j
+ (a − 1)(1 − F (p)) .
Similarly, we have the formulas for revenue per time step
er (p1,p2, . . . ,pn) =
n∑
j=1
a(1 − F (pj ))pj
(a − 1)(1 − F (pj )) + 1r j
and
er (p) =
n∑
j=1
a(1 − F (p))p
(a − 1)(1 − F (p)) + 1r j
.
We will compare the welfare and revenue that can be obtained by seing a single price against
seing several prices. Similarly to Section 4, we will show that if at least one dimension of the
parameters is not too extreme, e.g., the number of servers, the job length, or the probabilities of
jobs occurrence are bounded, then we can obtain a reasonable approximation of the welfare and
revenue in the multi-price seing by seing just one price.
Theorem E.1. For any prices p1,p2, . . . ,pn that we set in the multi-price seing, we can achieve a
welfare (resp. revenue, or any convex combination of welfare and revenue) approximation of at least
max
(
1
Hn
,
M − 1
M lnM ,
1
a
)
in the one-price seing, where Hn = 1 + 12 + · · · + 1n ≈ lnn is the nth Harmonic number and
M = maxi, j rir j .
In particular, if all probabilities of job occurrence are bounded below by c ≤ 1, then maxi, j SiSj ≤ 1c .
e theorem then implies that the approximation ratio is also at least
1
c −1
1
c ln( 1c ) =
c−1
ln c .
Proof. We rst consider welfare. We will work with the ratio
max(ew (p1), . . . , ew (pn))
ew (p1, . . . ,pn)
and try to minimize it.
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Writing Aj =
∫
x≥pj `dµ∫
x≥p1 `dµ
(in particular, A1 = 1), Bj = F (pj ), and R j = 1/r j for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the ratio
to minimize becomes
д(A1, . . . ,An ,B1, . . . ,Bn) := nmax
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
Aj
Ri + (a − 1)(1 − Bj )
)
· 1∑n
j=1
Ai
Ri+(a−1)(1−Bi )
.
LetUj =
∑n
i=1
1
Ri+(a−1)(1−Bj ) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and T =
∑n
i=1
Ai
Ri+(a−1)(1−Bi ) . We have
д(A1, . . . ,An ,B1, . . . ,Bn) =
maxnj=1(AjUj )
T
.
Case 1: e max function outputs the rst term, A1U1.
Taking into account that A1 = 1, we want to minimize the ratio
U1
T
=
(
n∑
i=1
1
Ri + (a − 1)(1 − B1)
)
· 1∑n
i=1
Ai
Ri+(a−1)(1−Bi )
,
where Ai ≤ U1Ui for all i ≥ 2.
For any Aj , if we x the remaining Ai and all Bi , this is a decreasing function in Aj . To minimize
it, we should set Ai = U1Ui for all i ≥ 2. e ratio becomes
1∑n
j=1
1∑n
i=1
Rj +(a−1)(1−Bj )
Ri +(a−1)(1−Bj )
.
Case 2: e max function outputs the jth term, AjUj , for some j ≥ 2.
is means that Ai ≤ AjUjUi for all i ≥ 2 with i , j, and Aj ≥
U1
Uj
. We want to minimize the ratio
AjUj
T
=
(
n∑
i=1
Aj
Ri + (a − 1)(1 − Bj )
)
· 1∑n
i=1
Ai
Ri+(a−1)(1−Bi )
.
For any i ≥ 2 with i , j, if we x all terms Ak except Ai and x all Bk , then this function is
decreasing in Ai . To minimize it, we should set Ai =
AjUj
Ui
. e resulting function is increasing in
Aj if we x all Bk , so we should set Aj = U1Uj . We obtain the same ratio as in Case 1.
Hence in either case, we are le with minimizing the function
h(B1, . . . ,Bn) := 1∑n
j=1
1∑n
i=1
Rj +(a−1)(1−Bj )
Ri +(a−1)(1−Bj )
.
In other words, the reciprocal of this function, which we want to maximize, is
h0(B1, . . . ,Bn) :=
n∑
j=1
1∑n
i=1
Rj+(a−1)(1−Bj )
Ri+(a−1)(1−Bj )
.
Assume without loss of generality that R1 ≥ R2 ≥ . . . ≥ Rn . For 1 ≤ j ≤ n, write hj =
1∑n
i=1
Rj +(a−1)(1−Bj )
Ri +(a−1)(1−Bj )
, i.e., the jth term of the sum that constitutes h0. e last n + 1 − j terms of the sum
in the denominator of hj are at least 1 since R j ≥ Ri for i ≥ j. is implies that hj ≤ 1n+1−j , and
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therefore
h0(B1, . . . ,Bn) = h1 + h2 + · · · + hn
≤ 1
n
+
1
n − 1 + · · · + 1 = Hn .
Equivalently, h(B1, . . . ,Bn) ≥ 1Hn .
Next, since M = maxi, j rir j , we have
Ri
Rj
≤ M for all i, j. Note that
Ri + (a − 1)(1 − Bi )
R j + (a − 1)(1 − Bi ) ≥
1
M
for all i, j. is implies that
hj ≤ 1
n + 1 − j + j−1M
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and therefore
h0(B1, . . . ,Bn) =
n∑
j=1
1
n − (j − 1) (1 − 1M )
=
n∑
j=1
1
n
· 1
1 − j−1n
(
1 − 1M
) .
e last sum is the le Riemann sum of the function 11−x(1− 1M ) . is function is increasing in x , so
its integral between 0 and 1 is an upper bound for our sum. Hence we have
h0(B1, . . . ,Bn) ≤
∫ 1
0
1
1 − x (1 − 1M ) dx = M lnMM − 1 .
Equivalently, h(B1, . . . ,Bn) ≥ M−1M lnM .
Finally, one can check that since Ri ≥ 1 and 1 − Bi ≤ 1 for all i ,
Ri + (a − 1)(1 − Bi )
R j + (a − 1)(1 − Bi ) ≥
1
a
· Ri
R j
for all i, j. It follows that
h0(B1, . . . ,Bn) ≤
n∑
i=1
1∑n
j=1
1
a · RiRj
= a
n∑
i=1
1∑n
j=1
Ri
Rj
= a.
Equivalently, h(B1, . . . ,Bn) ≥ 1a .
Combining the three bounds, we have
h(B1, . . . ,Bn) ≥ max
(
1
Hn
,
M − 1
M lnM ,
1
a
)
,
as desired.
Finally, we can obtain analogous results for revenue by essentially repeating the same argument
but instead writing Aj =
(1−F (pj ))pj
(1−F (p1))p1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and for any convex combination of welfare and
revenue by writing Aj as the appropriate convex combination of the two corresponding terms. 
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We now address the tightness of the approximation ratio. e upper bound Hn for h0 is the best
possible in the sense that there exist values B1, . . . ,Bn ,R1, . . . ,Rn ,a such that h0 gets arbitrarily
close to Hn . In particular, take R j = c2(n−j) and Bj = 1 − c2(n−j )+1a−1 for some large constant c . We have
h0(B1, . . . ,Bn) =
n∑
j=1
1∑n
i=1
Rj+(a−1)(1−Bj )
Ri+(a−1)(1−Bj )
=
n∑
j=1
1∑n
i=1
c2(n−j )+c2(n−j )+1
c2(n−i )+c2(n−j )+1
=
n∑
j=1
1∑n
i=1
1+c
c2(j−i )+c
.
Taking c →∞, we nd that or j ≤ i , the fraction 1+cc2(j−i )+c converges to 1, while for j > i , it converges
to 0. Hence hj → 1n+1−j , and consequently h0 → Hn .
While this argument does not directly imply the tightness of the approximation ratio, we see it
as strong evidence for that claim.
F PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
We rst consider welfare. We will work with the ratio
max(dw (p1), . . . ,dw (pn))
dw (p1, . . . ,pn)
and try to minimize it.
Writing Aj =
∫
x≥pj `dµ∫
x≥p1 `dµ
(in particular, A1 = 1), Bj = F (pj ), and sj = 1Sj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the ratio to
minimize becomes
д(A1, . . . ,An ,B1, . . . ,Bn) := nmax
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
Aj
1 − (1 − Rsi )Bj + (1 − R)si
)
· 1∑n
i=1
Ai
1−(1−Rsi )Bi+(1−R)si
.
LetUj =
∑n
i=1
1
1−(1−Rsi )Bj+(1−R)sj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and T =
∑n
i=1
Ai
1−(1−Rsi )Bi+(1−R)si . We have
д(A1, . . . ,An ,B1, . . . ,Bn) =
maxnj=1(AjUj )
T
.
Case 1: e max function outputs the rst term, A1U1.
Taking into account that A1 = 1, we want to minimize the ratio
U1
T
=
(
n∑
i=1
1
1 − (1 − Rsi )B1 + (1 − R)si
)
· 1∑n
i=1
Ai
1−(1−Rsi )Bi+(1−R)si
,
where Ai ≤ U1Ui for all i ≥ 2.
For any Aj , if we x the remaining Ai and all Bi , this is a decreasing function in Aj . To minimize
it, we should set Ai = U1Ui for all i ≥ 2. e ratio becomes
1∑n
j=1
1∑n
i=1
1−(1−Rsj )Bj +(1−R)sj
1−(1−Rsi )Bj +(1−R)si
.
Case 2: e max function outputs the jth term, AjUj , for some j ≥ 2.
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is means that Ai ≤ AjUjUi for all i ≥ 2 with i , j, and Aj ≥
U1
Uj
. We want to minimize the ratio
AjUj
T
=
(
n∑
i=1
Aj
1 − (1 − Rsi )Bj + (1 − R)si
)
· 1∑n
i=1
Ai
1−(1−Rsi )Bi+(1−R)si
.
For any i ≥ 2 with i , j, if we x all terms Ak except Ai and x all Bk , then this function is
decreasing in Ai . To minimize it, we should set Ai =
AjUj
Ui
. e resulting function is increasing in
Aj if we x all Bk , so we should set Aj = U1Uj . We obtain the same ratio as in Case 1.
Hence in either case, we are le with minimizing the function
h(B1, . . . ,Bn) := 1∑n
j=1
1∑n
i=1
1−(1−Rsj )Bj +(1−R)sj
1−(1−Rsi )Bj +(1−R)si
.
In other words, the reciprocal of this function, which we want to maximize, is
h0(B1, . . . ,Bn) :=
n∑
j=1
1∑n
i=1
1−(1−Rsj )Bj+(1−R)sj
1−(1−Rsi )Bj+(1−R)si
=
n∑
j=1
1∑n
i=1
1−Bj+sj (1−R+RBj )
1−Bj+si (1−R+RBj )
.
Assume without loss of generality that s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sn . For 1 ≤ j ≤ n, write hj =
1∑n
i=1
1−Bj +sj (1−R+RBj )
1−Bj +si (1−R+RBj )
, i.e., the jth term of the sum that constitutes h0. e last n + 1 − j terms of the
sum in the denominator of hj are at least 1 since sj ≥ si for i ≥ j . is implies that hj ≤ 1n+1−j , and
therefore
h0(B1, . . . ,Bn) = h1 + h2 + · · · + hn
≤ 1
n
+
1
n − 1 + · · · + 1 = Hn .
Equivalently, h(B1, . . . ,Bn) ≥ 1Hn .
Next, since M = maxi, j SiSj , we have
si
sj
≤ M for all i, j. Note that
1 − (1 − Rsj )Bj + (1 − R)sj
1 − (1 − Rsi )Bj + (1 − R)si ≥
1
M
for all i, j , since both the numerator and the denominator are positive, and when seen as a function
of Bj , the expression is monotonic and takes on values at least 1M at Bj = 0 and Bj = 1. is implies
that
hj ≤ 1
n + 1 − j + j−1M
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and therefore
h0(B1, . . . ,Bn) =
n∑
j=1
1
n − (j − 1) (1 − 1M )
=
n∑
j=1
1
n
· 1
1 − j−1n
(
1 − 1M
) .
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e last sum is the le Riemann sum of the function 11−x(1− 1M ) . is function is increasing in x , so
its integral between 0 and 1 is an upper bound for our sum. Hence we have
h0(B1, . . . ,Bn) ≤
∫ 1
0
1
1 − x (1 − 1M ) dx = M lnMM − 1 .
Equivalently, h(B1, . . . ,Bn) ≥ M−1M lnM .
Combining the two bounds, we have
h(B1, . . . ,Bn) ≥ max
(
1
Hn
,
M − 1
M lnM
)
,
as desired.
Finally, we can obtain analogous results for revenue by essentially repeating the same argument
but instead writing Aj =
(1−F (pj ))pj
(1−F (p1))p1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and for any convex combination of welfare and
revenue by writing Aj as the appropriate convex combination of the two corresponding terms.
Done with the proof of the theorem, we now address the tightness of the approximation ratio. e
upper boundHn forh0 is the best possible in the sense that there exist values B1, . . . ,Bn , s1, . . . , sn ,R
such that h0 gets arbitrarily close to Hn . In particular, take sj = c−2j and Bj = 1 − c−2j+1 for some
large constant c , and R = 1. We have
h0(B1, . . . ,Bn) =
n∑
j=1
1∑n
i=1
1−Bj+Bj sj
1−Bj+Bj si
=
n∑
j=1
1∑n
i=1
c−2j+1+c−2j−c−4j+1
c−2j+1+c−2i−c−2j−2i+1
=
n∑
j=1
1∑n
i=1
c+1−c−2j+1
c+c2(j−i )−c−2i+1
.
Taking c →∞, we nd that for j ≤ i , the fraction c+1−c−2j+1c+c2(j−i )−c−2i+1 converges to 1, while for j > i , it
converges to 0. Hence hj → 1n+1−j , and consequently h0 → Hn .
While this argument does not directly imply the tightness of the approximation ratio, we see it
as strong evidence for that claim.
